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   Our	  Canadian	  legislature	  and	  democratic	  governments	  around	  the	  world	  are	  haunted	  by	  
the	  history	  of	  oppression,	  discrimination,	  and	  marginalization	  of	  minority	  groups	  that	  still	  
suffer,	  politically	  and	  socially,	  the	  material	  effects	  of	  those	  injustices.	  Most	  of	  these	  
governments	  have	  extended	  the	  franchise	  universally,	  and	  according	  to	  dominant	  liberal	  
democratic	  theory,	  all	  citizens	  should	  have	  equal	  access	  to	  the	  political	  institutions	  that	  govern	  
their	  lives	  by	  way	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  one-­‐person-­‐one-­‐vote.	  Yet,	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  
proportion	  of	  members	  in	  a	  distinct	  (often	  marginalized)	  group	  within	  the	  population	  and	  the	  
proportion	  of	  members	  of	  that	  group	  acting	  as	  representatives	  in	  parliament	  is	  empirically	  
evident.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  this	  absence	  is	  problematic,	  for	  symbolic	  as	  well	  as	  functional	  and	  
moral	  reasons1.	  This	  is	  a	  problem	  of	  political	  representation.	  
	   When	  I	  first	  submitted	  my	  proposal	  for	  this	  project,	  I	  was	  working	  on	  my	  undergraduate	  
thesis.	  In	  that	  paper,	  I	  was	  defending	  a	  conception	  of	  descriptive	  representation	  on	  four	  
grounds:	  symbolic	  value,	  its	  propensity	  to	  encourage	  deliberation,	  the	  improvement	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  governing	  bodies	  and	  minority	  groups,	  and	  the	  insight	  or	  experiential	  
knowledge	  that	  descriptive	  representatives	  offer.	  I	  had	  initially	  proposed	  using	  Richard	  Rorty’s	  
pragmatic	  epistemology	  to	  elucidate	  exactly	  what	  it	  meant	  for	  experiential	  knowledge	  to	  
change	  the	  outcome	  of	  political	  deliberation.	  But,	  as	  I	  was	  reading	  Rorty’s	  various	  works	  on	  
pragmatism	  and	  cultural	  politics,	  I	  found	  that	  pragmatic	  epistemology	  offers	  us	  –	  us	  being	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  For	  more	  in-­‐depth	  discussions	  of	  these	  problems,	  see	  Grey	  (2002),	  Mansbridge	  (2000),	  Phillips	  (1995),	  
Tremblay	  and	  Pelletier	  (2000),	  and	  Williams	  (1998).	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people	  who	  see	  systemic	  oppression	  and	  marginalization	  and	  wish	  to	  ameliorate	  it	  –	  much	  
more	  than	  simply	  an	  electoral	  strategy.	  
	   In	  this	  paper,	  I	  will	  explain	  Rorty’s	  pragmatic	  view	  of	  truth	  and	  knowledge,	  and	  the	  
consequences	  of	  that	  view	  for	  human	  society	  and	  moral	  progress.	  I	  will	  then	  argue	  that	  in	  light	  
of	  these	  consequences,	  the	  legislature	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  political	  representative	  contain	  much	  
more	  transformational	  power	  than	  we	  usually	  take	  it	  to	  possess,	  and	  that	  this	  has	  a	  great	  deal	  
of	  potential	  for	  social	  change.	  I	  will	  then	  argue	  that	  this	  potential	  is	  best	  realized	  when	  two	  
changes	  are	  implemented	  in	  our	  political	  and	  electoral	  systems:	  the	  first,	  an	  electoral	  system	  
that	  facilitates	  increased	  descriptive	  representation	  of	  women	  and	  minority	  groups,	  and	  
second,	  a	  commitment	  to	  good	  faith	  and	  open-­‐minded	  deliberation	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
representatives.	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  two	  changes	  yield	  three	  benefits:	  increased	  satisfaction	  of	  
the	  interests	  of	  various	  groups	  in	  society,	  greater	  legitimacy	  of	  political	  institutions	  (and	  thus	  
the	  decisions	  that	  they	  make),	  and	  political	  decisions	  that	  are	  ethical	  and	  empathetic	  to	  the	  
experiences	  of	  all	  citizens.	  	  
	   The	  question	  of	  truth	  –	  what	  it	  is,	  if	  anything	  –	  has	  been	  debated	  since	  the	  ancients,	  but	  
there	  is	  certainly	  a	  common-­‐sense	  definition	  that	  most	  of	  us	  work	  with:	  accordance	  with	  fact	  or	  
reality	  (New	  Oxford	  American	  Dictionary).	  That	  is,	  “the	  truth”	  is	  generally	  thought	  of	  as	  the	  
actual	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  the	  world,	  independent	  of	  human	  experience	  or	  belief;	  or,	  as	  Goodman	  
calls	  it,	  the	  “way	  the	  world	  is”	  (Goodman).	  What	  we	  seek,	  then,	  when	  we	  inquire	  into	  scientific,	  
political,	  or	  social	  problems,	  is	  a	  set	  of	  propositions,	  believed	  and	  justified,	  that	  describes	  what	  
actually	  is	  the	  case.	  For	  example,	  when	  political	  scientists	  Tremblay	  and	  Pelletier	  set	  out	  to	  
perform	  a	  study	  on	  what	  motivates	  political	  representatives	  more	  –	  their	  gender	  or	  their	  party	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affiliation	  –	  they	  were	  seeking	  to	  gather	  data	  (justification)	  which	  supported	  a	  conclusion	  
(belief)	  that	  accurately	  reflected	  how	  representatives	  behaved	  (truth)	  (Tremblay	  and	  Pelletier).	  	  
	   Rorty	  argues,	  in	  the	  American	  pragmatist	  tradition,	  that	  the	  quest	  for	  “truth”	  as	  defined	  
above	  is	  ill	  conceived.	  He	  points	  out	  that	  when	  evaluating	  claims	  to	  knowledge	  –	  such	  as	  the	  
conclusion	  reached	  by	  Tremblay	  and	  Pelletier	  –	  what	  earns	  one	  proposition	  the	  designation	  of	  
“true”	  is	  not	  really	  any	  inherent	  characteristic,	  but	  rather	  the	  justificatory	  set	  of	  beliefs	  or	  
experiences	  that	  accompany	  it.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  do	  not	  evaluate	  knowledge	  claims	  by	  
comparing	  them	  to	  the	  ‘truth’	  because	  we	  don’t	  have	  a	  transcendental	  access	  to	  it.	  That	  is	  why	  
we	  engage	  in	  inquiry	  in	  the	  first	  place!	  As	  Rorty	  says,	  “We	  cannot	  find	  a	  skyhook	  which	  lifts	  us	  
out	  of	  mere	  coherence	  –	  mere	  agreement	  –	  to	  find	  something	  like	  “correspondence	  to	  reality	  
as	  it	  is	  in	  itself””	  (Rorty,	  Science	  as	  Solidarity	  38).	  What	  we	  do	  do	  when	  we	  evaluate	  knowledge	  
claims	  is	  look	  at	  the	  supporting	  body	  of	  evidence	  and	  debate	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  indeed	  
sufficient	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  claim	  being	  made,	  and	  as	  a	  community	  of	  knowers,	  converge	  
upon	  a	  particular	  belief.	  It	  is	  only	  then	  that	  we	  attribute	  truth	  value	  to	  it.	  
	   Rorty	  concludes	  that	  in	  light	  of	  this	  understanding	  of	  how	  knowledge	  claims	  are	  made,	  
there	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  a	  “way	  the	  world	  is”,	  but	  the	  “difference	  [between	  justification	  and	  
truth]	  makes	  no	  difference	  to	  my	  decisions	  about	  what	  to	  do”	  (Rorty,	  Is	  Truth	  a	  Goal	  of	  Inquiry?	  
19).	  What	  we	  are	  doing	  when	  we	  are	  coming	  together	  as	  an	  epistemic	  community	  is	  not	  striving	  
for	  objectivity,	  but	  rather	  for	  solidarity	  –	  convergence	  among	  that	  community	  as	  to	  what	  the	  
correct	  interpretation	  of	  our	  sense	  experience	  is.	  He	  says,	  
	   …	  those	  who	  wish	  to	  reduce	  objectivity	  to	  solidarity	  –	  call	  them	  ‘pragmatists’	  –	  
do	  not	  require	  either	  a	  metaphysics	  or	  an	  epistemology.	  They	  view	  truth	  as,	  in	  William	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James’	  phrase,	  what	  is	  good	  for	  us	  to	  believe.	  So	  they	  do	  not	  need	  an	  account	  of	  a	  
relation	  between	  beliefs	  and	  objects	  called	  “correspondence,”	  nor	  an	  account	  of	  human	  
cognitive	  abilities	  which	  ensures	  that	  our	  species	  is	  capable	  of	  entering	  into	  that	  
relation.	  (Rorty,	  Solidarity	  or	  objectivity?	  22)	  
He	  wishes	  to	  dismiss	  altogether	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  something	  is	  true	  in	  the	  
objectivist	  sense	  given	  above.	  
	   This	  conception	  of	  truth	  is	  a	  rather	  difficult	  one	  to	  accept,	  particularly	  when	  it	  calls	  into	  
question	  the	  very	  foundation	  of	  our	  scientific	  and	  academic	  enterprise.	  Indeed,	  Rorty’s	  support	  
for	  this	  treatment	  of	  truth	  has	  led	  to	  accusations	  of	  relativism,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  hard	  to	  see	  why.	  
Our	  scientific	  enterprise	  is	  predicated	  on	  this	  desire	  to	  know,	  objectively,	  what	  is	  the	  case,	  and	  
when	  these	  knowledge	  claims	  are	  dependent	  on	  the	  community	  in	  which	  they	  are	  made,	  then	  
it	  would	  seem	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  have	  two	  contradictory	  knowledge	  claims	  being	  made,	  and	  
accepted,	  in	  two	  different	  communities.	  We	  want	  to	  be	  able	  to	  say	  that	  one	  (likely	  our	  own	  
community’s)	  is	  right,	  that	  it	  reflects	  “the	  way	  the	  world	  is”,	  and	  that	  the	  other	  is	  incorrect.	  We	  
want	  to	  be	  able	  to	  say	  that	  we	  make	  these	  claims	  because	  they	  are	  true.	  	  
	   But	  this	  objection	  to	  Rorty	  is	  perhaps	  unfair.	  Rorty,	  too,	  wants	  to	  be	  able	  to	  say	  that	  the	  
beliefs	  that	  we	  hold	  are	  preferable	  to	  the	  alternatives,	  that	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  for	  
accepting	  one	  claim	  over	  another.	  What	  he	  is	  doing,	  however,	  is	  describing	  the	  events	  that	  lead	  
to	  the	  acceptance	  of	  knowledge	  claims.	  He	  merely	  says	  that	  since	  we	  lack	  this	  transcendental	  
access	  to	  truth,	  we	  must	  necessarily	  rely	  on	  solidarity	  on	  one	  justificatory	  set.	  I	  think	  that	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  stress	  that	  Rorty	  is	  not	  making	  a	  claim	  about	  the	  existence	  or	  nature	  of	  truth,	  but	  
rather	  saying	  that	  the	  belief	  that	  there	  is	  such	  an	  independent	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  not	  useful	  to	  us	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–	  it	  is	  not	  the	  way	  that	  we,	  as	  human	  animals,	  work.	  Truth	  does	  not	  just	  appear	  to	  us,	  as	  some	  
sort	  of	  divine	  revelation	  about	  the	  universe.	  As	  he	  says,	  “’Truth’	  is	  not	  the	  name	  of	  a	  power	  that	  
eventually	  wins	  through;	  it	  is	  just	  the	  nominalization	  of	  an	  approbative	  adjective”	  (Rorty,	  
Feminism	  and	  Pragmatism	  226).	  The	  account	  that	  ‘wins	  out’	  in	  the	  end	  is	  simply	  the	  one	  that	  
has	  the	  justification	  that	  is	  convincing	  to	  the	  greatest	  number	  of	  people	  in	  the	  debate.	  Inquiry,	  
then,	  is	  a	  necessarily	  social	  project,	  and	  insofar	  as	  we	  can	  describe	  what	  happens	  when	  a	  theory	  
is	  either	  confirmed	  or	  disconfirmed,	  Rorty’s	  account	  seems	  to	  be	  accurate.	  So,	  Rorty	  is	  neither	  
making	  an	  epistemological	  nor	  a	  metaphysical	  claim	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  truth,	  but	  is	  rather	  
making	  an	  observation	  about	  the	  way	  we	  come	  to	  posses	  “knowledge”	  in	  human	  society.	  	  
	   Regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  you	  accept	  Rorty’s	  account	  when	  applied	  specifically	  to	  
scientific	  inquiry,	  his	  argument	  has	  some	  important	  and	  revealing	  consequences	  for	  moral	  and	  
political	  actions.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  troubling	  consequences	  of	  Rorty’s	  conception	  of	  truth	  –	  as	  
being	  what	  a	  community	  approbates	  –	  is	  that	  it	  seems	  to	  leave	  oppressed	  and	  marginalized	  
groups	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  stipulations	  of	  the	  majority.	  If	  a	  group	  is	  able	  to	  justify	  unequal	  
treatment	  of	  one	  group	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  acceptable	  to	  the	  majority,	  and	  if	  we	  lack	  access	  to	  
universal	  moral	  truths,	  then	  we	  seem	  to	  be	  without	  the	  moral	  force	  to	  condemn	  such	  
marginalization.	  For	  example,	  when	  women	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  definition	  of	  “persons”	  in	  
Canada	  in	  the	  19th	  century,	  then	  for	  all	  intents	  and	  purposes,	  they	  in	  fact	  were	  not,	  on	  Rorty’s	  
account.	  There	  is	  no	  “truth”	  that	  we	  can	  motion	  to;	  the	  exclusion	  of	  women	  did	  not	  violate	  any	  
empirical	  or	  moral	  imperatives.	  Rorty	  himself	  seemed	  cognizant	  of	  this	  worry	  when	  he	  said	  that	  
in	  accepting	  this	  pragmatist	  account,	  we	  “have	  to	  give	  up	  the	  comforting	  belief	  that	  competing	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groups	  will	  always	  be	  able	  to	  reason	  together	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  plausible	  and	  neutral	  premises”	  
(Rorty,	  Human	  Rights	  206).	  	  
	   However,	  in	  Feminism	  and	  Pragmatism,	  Rorty	  argues	  that	  pragmatism	  and	  the	  
pragmatic	  account	  of	  knowledge	  and	  truth,	  actually	  gives	  minority	  groups	  more	  ammunition	  to	  
procure	  social	  change	  (212).	  In	  keeping	  with	  his	  view	  of	  ‘truth’	  being	  what	  is	  agreed	  upon	  by	  
communities,	  Rorty	  argues	  that	  moral	  truths,	  social	  practices,	  and	  personal	  identities	  are	  
likewise	  socially	  dependent.	  Laws,	  practices,	  and	  hierarchies	  are	  created	  and	  maintained	  by	  the	  
dominant	  social	  group.	  These	  values	  become	  embedded	  in	  the	  dominant	  language,	  and	  this	  
language	  helps	  maintain	  this	  state	  of	  affairs	  (remember	  the	  example	  of	  Canadian	  women	  as	  
non-­‐persons.	  The	  dominant	  definition	  of	  ‘person’	  excluded	  them,	  and	  helped	  maintain	  their	  
oppression).	  But,	  the	  advantage	  offered	  by	  a	  pragmatist	  conception	  of	  truth,	  Rorty	  argues,	  is	  
that	  we	  can	  change	  these	  states	  of	  affairs	  by	  imagining	  a	  future	  in	  which	  the	  conditions	  of	  
society	  are	  such	  that	  they	  are	  no	  longer	  painful	  or	  disadvantageous	  for	  certain	  groups,	  and	  
begin	  to	  speak	  about	  that	  future,	  creating	  the	  concepts	  and	  ideas	  that	  reflect	  the	  values	  of	  this	  
future,	  and	  injecting	  those	  concepts	  and	  ideas	  into	  the	  language	  of	  the	  dominant	  group.	  These	  
subordinate	  groups	  create	  justificatory	  arguments	  for	  change,	  based	  on	  their	  experiences	  of	  
suffering.	  
	   In	  the	  past,	  individuals	  struggling	  for	  social	  change	  have	  done	  so	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  absolute	  
moral	  truths	  –	  for	  example,	  women	  are	  persons,	  even	  if	  they	  haven’t	  been	  treated	  as	  such.	  But	  
Rorty	  contends	  that	  what	  we	  are	  convinced	  by	  when	  we	  appeal	  to	  those	  absolute	  truths	  is	  not	  
the	  existence	  of	  those	  truths	  themselves	  –	  they	  exert	  no	  force	  on	  us	  –	  but	  rather	  the	  accounts	  
of	  hardship	  and	  oppression	  that	  those	  who	  utilize	  the	  truths	  seek	  to	  address.	  He	  argues	  that	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political	  and	  moral	  action	  is	  not	  achieved	  by	  appeals	  to	  absolute	  moral	  truths,	  but	  rather	  by	  
making	  “invidious	  comparisons	  between	  the	  actual	  present	  and	  a	  possible,	  if	  inchoate,	  future”	  
(Rorty,	  Feminism	  and	  Pragmatism	  217).	  This	  is	  particularly	  evident	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  human	  
rights,	  and	  what	  might	  be	  called	  moral	  progress	  in	  the	  last	  two	  hundred	  years.	  He	  says,	  
These	  two	  centuries	  are	  most	  easily	  understood	  not	  as	  a	  period	  of	  deepening	  our	  
understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  rationality	  or	  of	  morality,	  but	  rather	  as	  one	  in	  which	  
there	  occurred	  an	  astonishingly	  rapid	  progress	  of	  sentiments,	  in	  which	  it	  has	  become	  
much	  easier	  for	  us	  to	  be	  moved	  to	  action	  by	  sad	  and	  sentimental	  stories”	  (Rorty,	  Human	  
Rights	  185)	  
He	  does	  not	  use	  “sad	  and	  sentimental	  stories”	  in	  a	  pejorative	  sense,	  but	  in	  a	  particularly	  honest	  
one.	  The	  stories	  of	  oppression,	  discrimination,	  even	  violence,	  committed	  against	  some	  groups	  
by	  others	  are	  truly	  heartbreaking,	  and	  it	  is	  through	  this	  heartbreaking	  that	  members	  of	  the	  
dominant	  group	  come	  to	  empathize	  with	  the	  marginalized,	  to	  see	  in	  them	  their	  own	  humanity,	  
and	  to	  seek	  change.	  This	  is	  the	  power	  of	  social	  discourse,	  the	  language	  sharing	  of	  the	  majority	  
and	  the	  minority,	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  imagined	  futures	  to	  be	  achieved,	  not	  because	  they	  are	  
natural	  or	  inevitable,	  but	  because	  we	  want	  them	  to.	  
	   So,	  from	  Rorty,	  we	  have	  learned	  that	  what	  matters	  in	  knowledge	  attribution	  is	  not	  truth	  
value,	  but	  justification,	  and	  knowledge	  claims	  gain	  their	  status	  by	  the	  solidarity	  of	  an	  epistemic	  
community	  –	  by	  the	  convergence	  of	  agreement.	  Thus,	  knowledge	  is	  necessarily	  social,	  and	  
produced	  not	  only	  scientifically,	  but	  linguistically.	  This	  reframing	  (and	  it	  is	  a	  reframing	  because	  
the	  process	  of	  investigation	  is	  not	  itself	  changed,	  but	  only	  our	  understanding	  of	  it)	  of	  truth	  and	  
knowledge	  impacts	  moral	  and	  political	  progress	  in	  that	  it	  prevents	  us	  from	  being	  able	  to	  say	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that	  state	  of	  affairs	  x	  is	  better	  or	  more	  ideal	  than	  state	  of	  affairs	  y.	  We	  cannot	  characterize	  the	  
social	  and	  political	  change	  we	  have	  undergone	  up	  until	  this	  point	  as	  moving	  towards	  the	  way	  it	  
should	  be	  in	  an	  objective	  sense,	  but	  we	  can	  agree	  that	  state	  of	  affairs	  x	  is	  better	  for	  us	  than	  
state	  of	  affairs	  y.	  Thus,	  moral	  and	  political	  progress	  is	  a	  social	  convention	  too,	  and	  this	  gives	  us	  
a	  great	  deal	  of	  power	  and	  agency	  in	  that	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  change	  things	  that	  we	  find	  
unsatisfactory	  by	  way	  of	  solidarity	  around	  a	  different	  state	  of	  affairs.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  ameliorating	  
the	  oppression	  or	  disadvantage	  of	  one	  group	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  another,	  this	  is	  best	  achieved	  
through	  the	  sharing	  of	  experiences,	  through	  sad	  and	  sentimental	  stories.	  When	  the	  subordinate	  
group	  is	  able	  to	  share	  with	  the	  dominant	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  are	  negatively	  impacted	  by	  the	  
status	  quo,	  then	  the	  dominant	  group	  is	  able	  to	  identify	  with	  that	  suffering,	  and	  collectively,	  
society	  can	  agree	  to	  pursue	  change.	  This	  is	  all	  achieved	  through	  imagination,	  communication,	  
and	  empathy.	  	  
	   What	  does	  this	  mean	  for	  our	  political	  institutions?	  It	  means	  that	  what	  happens	  in	  the	  
legislature	  is	  not	  merely	  procedural.	  It	  is	  not	  just	  a	  means	  of	  collective	  decision-­‐making.	  It	  is	  
actually	  a	  site	  where	  imagination,	  communication,	  empathy	  and	  consequently,	  social	  change	  is	  
possible.	  The	  legislature	  is	  a	  potential	  site	  of	  transformation.	  However,	  while	  it	  has	  this	  
potential,	  there	  remains	  the	  fact	  of	  disproportionate	  representation	  of	  dominant	  social	  groups,	  
and	  the	  relative	  silencing	  of	  women	  and	  minorities	  (at	  least	  in	  our	  Canadian	  context).	  For	  us	  to	  
truly	  tap	  into	  this	  transformational	  power,	  two	  systemic	  changes	  are	  needed.	  
	   First,	  social	  change	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  sharing	  of	  stories	  and	  experiences.	  When	  a	  
particular	  homogenous	  group	  dominates	  the	  legislature,	  those	  stories	  and	  experiences	  are	  
limited	  or	  not	  available.	  Of	  course,	  women	  and	  minority	  groups	  might	  be	  represented	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substantively,	  in	  that	  representatives	  who	  are	  not	  themselves	  members	  of	  those	  groups	  can	  
relate	  on	  their	  behalf	  their	  needs,	  interests,	  and	  experiences.	  But	  representatives	  who	  are	  
themselves	  members	  of	  those	  groups,	  who	  have	  themselves	  experienced	  marginalization	  or	  
disadvantage,	  have	  a	  much	  more	  intimate	  understanding	  of	  what	  changes	  are	  needed,	  and	  
what	  issues	  need	  to	  be	  privileged	  on	  the	  legislative	  agenda.	  They	  can	  speak	  with	  the	  authority	  
of	  experience	  and	  insight,	  and	  they	  provide	  a	  more	  direct	  and	  comfortable	  line	  of	  
communication	  between	  the	  electorate	  and	  the	  representative.	  	  
	   However,	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  simply	  to	  have	  those	  individuals	  present	  in	  sufficient	  
numbers.	  What	  is	  also	  needed	  for	  descriptive	  representation	  to	  be	  effective	  is	  a	  commitment	  
on	  the	  part	  of	  representatives	  to	  a	  thorough,	  open-­‐minded	  and	  earnest	  deliberative	  process.	  
Through	  this	  good	  faith	  deliberation,	  representatives	  should	  listen	  to	  the	  concerns	  and	  
experiences	  every	  group,	  and	  balance	  the	  needs	  and	  interests	  of	  their	  own	  constituency	  with	  
the	  needs	  of	  others.	  This	  results	  in	  a	  diversity	  of	  representatives	  who	  work	  together,	  despite	  
disagreement	  –	  or,	  indeed,	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  disagreement	  –	  to	  hear	  the	  priorities	  of	  other	  social	  
groups,	  ensuring	  the	  procedural	  equality	  of	  their	  constituents	  with	  an	  ear	  open	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  
certain	  political	  actions	  on	  particular	  groups	  of	  people.	  	  
	   I	  recognize	  that	  these	  suggestions	  are	  vague	  and	  perhaps	  idealistic.	  Unfortunately,	  I	  do	  
not	  have	  the	  time	  here	  to	  work	  through	  a	  political	  science	  of	  how	  such	  changes	  could	  be	  
enacted.	  But	  I	  do	  think	  that	  we	  can	  see	  three	  major	  benefits	  resulting	  from	  a	  move	  in	  this	  
direction.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  the	  interests	  of	  a	  greater	  proportion	  of	  the	  population.	  
As	  it	  stands,	  unequal	  representation	  of	  social	  groups	  leaves	  their	  interests	  and	  preferences	  out	  
of	  current	  political	  deliberations.	  While	  they	  are	  there	  to	  a	  small	  extent	  in	  the	  form	  of	  lobby	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groups	  and	  substantive	  representation,	  perhaps	  even	  through	  what	  Jane	  Mansbridge	  calls	  
“surrogate”	  representation	  (Mansbridge,	  Rethinking	  Representation),	  their	  physical	  absence	  
means	  that	  they	  are	  not	  able	  to	  share	  their	  personal	  experiences,	  unable	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  
sentiment	  of	  other	  representatives,	  and	  left	  out	  of	  the	  considerations	  of	  new	  policy	  
implementation.	  Greater	  representation	  would	  guarantee	  that	  their	  interests	  are	  considered	  
equally,	  and	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  that	  they	  are	  satisfied.	  
	   Secondly,	  descriptive	  representation	  increases	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  political	  procedure	  
that	  yields	  collective	  decisions.	  One	  of	  the	  foundational	  principles	  of	  democracy	  is	  the	  equality	  
of	  all	  citizens,	  and	  equal	  opportunity	  to	  affect	  the	  decisions	  that	  are	  made	  in	  the	  legislature	  
(Christiano	  3).	  It	  ensures	  that	  equality	  is	  not	  just	  met	  in	  principle,	  but	  that	  certain	  systemic	  
biases	  are	  compensated	  for.	  I	  thank	  Angie	  White	  for	  raising	  this	  point.	  	  
	   Lastly,	  and	  I	  think	  most	  importantly,	  it	  makes	  the	  legislature	  a	  site	  for	  moral	  action.	  
Again,	  returning	  to	  Rorty,	  we	  understand	  that	  moral	  progress	  is	  not	  simply	  an	  emergence	  of	  the	  
‘right’	  state	  of	  affairs,	  but	  actually	  the	  product	  of	  social	  deliberation	  on	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do.	  
The	  presence	  of	  a	  diversity	  of	  people	  able	  to	  give	  first	  hand	  accounts	  of	  the	  injustice	  of	  their	  
experience	  is	  an	  opportunity	  for	  that	  deliberation,	  and	  opportunity	  for	  the	  marginalized	  to	  
share	  their	  imagined	  future,	  and	  to	  affect	  the	  dominant	  language	  of	  oppression.	  
	   In	  a	  way,	  it	  perhaps	  looks	  like	  I	  am	  arguing	  for	  political	  change	  that	  is	  somewhat	  easy	  to	  
agree	  with,	  at	  least	  in	  principle	  and	  aim,	  and	  justifying	  it	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  much	  more	  
controversial	  set	  of	  claims.	  However,	  I	  think	  that	  there	  is	  something	  importantly	  right	  about	  
Rorty’s	  conception	  of	  truth	  and	  human	  progress	  that	  sheds	  light	  at	  least	  on	  our	  political	  and	  
moral	  processes.	  While	  we	  are	  less	  inclined	  to	  think	  of	  politics	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  “truth”	  and	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“objectivity”	  and	  more	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  interests	  and	  needs,	  there	  are	  perhaps	  residual	  effects	  of	  
our	  society’s	  privileging	  of	  scientific,	  objective	  truths	  on	  which	  we	  base	  a	  number	  of	  our	  
decisions	  and	  actions	  –	  a	  ‘public	  hankering’	  for	  truths	  that	  demonstrate	  that	  a	  certain	  group’s	  
way	  is	  the	  right	  way	  and	  this	  sort	  of	  stubborn	  commitment	  gets	  in	  the	  way	  of	  open-­‐minded	  
deliberation	  (Rorty,	  Science	  as	  Solidarity	  37).	  The	  value	  of	  Rorty’s	  project,	  I	  think,	  lies	  in	  his	  
emphasis	  of	  the	  social	  nature	  of	  knowledge,	  and	  the	  ability	  for	  human	  beings	  to	  create	  social	  
change	  by	  affecting	  the	  dominant	  language	  and	  paradigm.	  Its	  strength	  is	  its	  recognition	  that	  
what	  creates	  the	  impetus	  for	  social	  change	  and	  the	  amelioration	  of	  the	  suffering	  of	  some	  
individuals	  is	  the	  sharing	  of	  those	  stories	  of	  experience	  and	  the	  feeling	  of	  empathy	  by	  one	  
group	  for	  another.	  It	  gives	  us	  a	  powerful	  agency,	  and	  makes	  our	  political	  institutions	  capable	  of	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